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a b s t r a c t
In spite of progress in intervention research, our understanding of the transformation of knowledge from
the research into national working environment programmes is limited. Research in state regulation is
mainly aimed at compliance and efﬁciency of public administration, while little attention is paid to
why and how public and private organisations subsequently are to improve their working environment.
This paper suggests a model which can bridge this gap. It is based on a combination of theories about
basic policy instruments (regulation, incentives and information) with realistic analysis focusing on
mechanisms and context, and ﬁnally institutional theory proposing coercive, normative and mimetic
mechanisms as explanations for organisational behaviour.
The model is applied to an intervention aimed at reduction of the risk of musculoskeletal disorders
among bricklayers in Denmark. Our analysis of the case shows how various actors, including the author-
ities, employers, unions and bi-partite committees, developed a programme combining the policy instru-
ments over a considerable period of time and that all three institutional mechanisms affected the
outcome. This integration of various actors and instruments, which was not necessarily planned from
the beginning, proved to be an effective way of facilitating the implementation of new preventive
measures in bricklaying. The analysis also indicates new intermediary mechanisms, such as programme
development, as an iterative process, and the importance of joint messages from employers and unions.
The model thus provides new insights into the relationship between policy instruments and workplace
health and safety outcomes.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Evidence about risks in the working environment and the re-
lated health consequences has increased dramatically during the
last decades. The knowledge about preventive measures and inter-
ventions have lacked behind among other due to methodological
difﬁculties (Goldenhar et al., 2001) but the knowledge are in these
years growing, among others supported by reviews (See examples
in Bambra et al., 2007; Egan et al., 2007; Hale et al., 2010; Lehtola
et al., 2008; Nielsen et al., 2010; Robson et al., 2007; Ruotsalainen
et al., 2006; Tompa et al., 2007). However, knowing something
does not necessarily imply that the knowledge is applied in prac-
tice, and the increased knowledge about risks and their prevention
does not seem to have caused any considerable improvement of
the working environment (Hämäläinen et al., 2009; Milczarek
et al., 2009; Schneider et al., 2010).
It is therefore up to stakeholders in the society to transform evi-
dence from research to operational policy instruments and subse-
quently secure that these instruments are applied in practice in
ﬁrms. This transformation has since the early industrialisation
been almost synonymous with state-organised labour inspection.
Originally, labour inspection had a fairly narrow focus on just a
few safety-related issues: for many years, child labour, accidents,
risks from boilers and power transmissions, exposure to lead and
noise were the typical problems covered. But since the 1970s,
the ﬁeld has broadened to cover many other aspects of work that
might have detrimental effects on health and safety and, in a
similar vein, preventive activities have grown to include many
different instruments in the effort to improve the working environ-
ment. Since the Robens Report (1972), legislation has prescribed a
general responsibility on employers, requiring a reasonable safe
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and sound working environment as a part of maintaining a general
‘‘license to operate’’. At the same time a large number of state reg-
ulators, professional bodies and social partners are now involved in
the working environment agenda and they all aim to inﬂuence the
companies. Finally, employers – or at least the larger companies in
many countries – now generally consider a reasonable working
environment a prerequisite for legitimacy among the organisa-
tion’s stakeholders (Almqvist and Henningsson, 2009; Frick and
Zwetsloot, 2007).
One track of research takes an interest in the function of societal
policy instruments. This research is in particularly looking at com-
pliance with state regulation of the working environment. The
point of departure is usually state enforcement of mainly prohibi-
tive rules for employers, and a lot of the literature focuses on legal
issues such as how to distinguish between compliance and non-
compliance (Amodu, 2008; Hutter, 1997). Recently, regulation
research has started to move towards an understanding of employ-
er motivation for compliance (Parker et al., 2011; Thornton et al.,
2005), but the perspective is still on enforcement of the state’s
rules for employers.
This development leaves one particular gap in our knowledge:
there is surprisingly little known about how evidence from
research can be transformed into working environment interven-
tions at the societal level which lead to practical improvements
in the workplace (See among the few examples Cox et al., 2008;
Mischke et al., 2013). Apart from providing information for general
dissemination about for instance certain risks– which is obviously
important – research also has to provide adequate answers on how
to transform knowledge from research into workplace practice.
In this paper, we probe into the knowledge gap between the
speciﬁc interventions to improve the working environment and
the broader policies that are applied to govern the ﬁeld. We discuss
a possible theoretical framework which can support such a
venture, and suggest a model as a point of departure for further
research into the relationship between policies and workplace
practice.
As theoretical stepping stones, we use Vedung’s (1998)
typology of policy instruments, the realistic understanding of
mechanisms (Pawson and Tilley, 1997), and Scott’s (2001)
neo-institutional theory with its focus on the legitimacy of organ-
isations. The framework is subsequently applied to a practical
example of reducing heavy lifting and awkward work postures in
bricklaying in Denmark. We complete the paper by discussing
the implications for research in the domain between working envi-
ronment policies and their practical application at workplace level.
2. Background
Research in the working environment is dominated by a bio-
medical research paradigm shaped by concurrent developments
in epidemiology and the testing of drugs. Randomized control trials
(RCTs) are considered the golden standard, and systematic Cochra-
ne reviews are thought of as the ideal methodology to identify use-
ful evidence (Verbeek et al., 2002). As intervention research
focusing on the prevention of occupational diseases and accidents
has evolved, the biomedical paradigm has followed suit. While this
paradigm is without question necessary for medical research and
useful for the identiﬁcation of causal factors in occupational health,
it is more problematic when used in intervention studies (Pawson,
2006; Pedersen et al., 2012). Intervention in the working environ-
ment cannot be compared to the testing of medicine. There are
several important reasons why not. First, RCTs are based on a dou-
ble-blind intervention: neither the researcher nor the patients
know whether the active medicine or a placebo is being provided,
whereas that will always be known to all the actors involved in
working environment interventions. Second, most working envi-
ronment interventions are aimed at organisational matters, such
as particular work procedures, the use of technical equipment,
the replacement of a certain technology or a chemical substance.
None of these actions can be individually randomized. Third, work-
ing environment interventions take place in organisations in which
the social actors react to the intervention and transform them to a
greater or smaller extent depending on their interpretation of the
intervention. Fourth, whereas the idea of RCTs is to control all
confounding variables, working environment interventions take
place in organisations which always exist in a unique context dif-
ferent from other organisations (see also Pawson (2006) for a
broader discussion of RCT in social programmes).
This means that the rigorous methodological demands of Coch-
rane reviews make it difﬁcult or in many cases almost impossible
to identify organisational level interventions which work. The
methodological demands will rule out most studies. In a review
of 7522 studies of interventions for the prevention of injuries in
construction, Lehtola et al. (2008) identiﬁed only ﬁve studies that
met the Cochrane criteria (See also Pedersen et al., 2012). In a sim-
ilar vein Mischke et al. (2013) could only include very few studies
in their review of the effect of labour inspection. The point is that
the Cochrane demands create an insurmountable barrier for useful
research in preventive measures, because they cannot be random-
ized and contextual inﬂuence cannot be excluded. There is there-
fore a need for other kinds of intervention studies which can give
the necessary evidence for preventive measures (Nilsen, 2007;
Pedersen et al., 2012). We will come back to the discussion of such
methods, but more importantly we will try to redirect research
attention from the intervention per se and look at interventions
as part of social programmes consisting of a number of different
policies, regulations, enforcements and other attempts to change
workplace practices.
As stated above, the regulation of the working environment has
been seen as a matter for the state since the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Rules have been issued and enforcement systems established
to secure compliance. Evidence for the effect of the regulation sys-
tem was traditionally not considered (See some of the few
examples in Mischke et al., 2013; Viscusi, 1986). Working environ-
ment regulation was considered by the state as similar to any other
regulative ﬁeld. The regulation was put into place in order to
secure social order, and if some risks seemed to get out of control,
stricter rules and stronger enforcement would be the answer
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Jacobsen, 2011).
Over the last thirty years, the development of society and the
introduction of new public management (NPM) (Hood, 1995) have
altered this picture. Nowadays, working environment regulation is
increasingly subject to demands for accountability, transparency
and efﬁciency just like any other public sector policy. This line of
policy development focuses primarily on the efﬁcient use of public
resources and compliance and less on the actual effect on the
working environment, even though that is the basic purpose of
the enforcement strategies. One reason for this is the difﬁculty in
establishing clear causal links between the authorities’ enforce-
ment strategies and any possible effects on health and safety out-
come. The consequence is that policy effectiveness in NPM terms is
measured through output proxies such as the number of inspected
workplaces, the number of improvement notices, and the number
of cases won in court.
Several attempts have been carried out to understand how rules
and inspection may lead to improved compliance and thus to a
healthier and safer workplace. For a recent overview, see May
and Winter (2012), which can be interpreted as fairly pessimistic
in relation to how far it is possible to develop generalizable knowl-
edge on the effect of enforcement styles. Nevertheless, there is a
need to get a better understanding of the process that turns
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regulation and policy into an improved situation in the regulated
organisation. The question is: What mechanisms can link policies
to concrete workplace practices that actually improve the working
environment?
An answer to this question implies moving beyond a focus on
state regulation policy in order to understand these mechanisms.
The state is no longer (if it ever was) the sole actor in enforcement
of societal policies. A large number of other actors, from semi-
governmental to independent civil society organisations, play an
increasingly important role. For the working environment, the
social partners (employers and unions) are key ﬁgures, but also
important are bi- and tripartite bodies, professional organisations,
certiﬁcation agencies, educational institutions, researchers, local
community groups, and the media. They all inﬂuence state policy
and practice, they all have their own policies, and state regulations
are formed in interaction with these actors. So we need to take
these actors into account if we are to understand how working
environment policies are transformed into actual workplace
practice. One important consequence is a shift in perspective from
the more limited study of the enforcement by state authorities to a
study of the broader societal efforts to regulate the working
environment.
The challenge is therefore to develop an understanding of what
happens in the gap between knowledge about preventive
strategies on the one hand and concrete workplace interventions
on the other hand, and this is what we will do in the next section
of the paper, where – as previously stated – we will develop an
analytical framework based on a typology of policy instruments
(Vedung, 1998), realistic evaluation with a focus on mechanism
and context (Pawson, 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997), and a
discussion of employer motivation to take action on improving
the working environment based on institutional theory (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2008; Scott, 2001).
3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Policy instruments
Our point of departure is the policy instruments available for
the societal urge to inﬂuence the working environment in
organisations3. Vedung (1998) has suggested a basic taxonomy of
three state policy instruments: regulation, economic incentives,
and information.
This division into the three basic policy instruments is derived
from Vedung’s analysis of the innumerable attempts by research-
ers to classify the means available to the state for changing any
prevailing situation in society in a particular direction. Vedung ar-
gues that these instruments comprise all possible instruments. He
refers to them with the metaphors: sticks, carrots and sermons.
The metaphors illustrate the three different ways of motivating
organisations to give priority to state policies: through enforce-
ment (rules, inspection and prosecution), through beneﬁts
(incentives), or through normative knowledge (information). The
three types of instruments represent an asymmetrical relationship
between the regulator and the receiver of the regulation. The
regulating parties have one or more of the following attributes:
(1) power to establish the legal standards, (2) the ability to reallo-
cate resources from the ‘unworthy’ to the ‘worthy’, and (3) the
resources to launch an information campaign from those who have
knowledge and insight to those who do not. We use this taxonomy
of policy instruments in our analysis of the broader societal effort
to achieve standards of health and safety, and of the ability of
organisations to improve and maintain their own working
environment.
Danish working environment legislation is based upon tripar-
tite regulation and has increasingly developed a culture of negoti-
ation, mediation and co-operation at an institutional level as well
as an organisational level between the social partners themselves
and between the social partners and the authorities (Sørensen
et al., 2009). Other civil society institutions are also involved, and
a Danish practice has evolved in which all three kinds of policy
instruments are often applied to the same target group at the same
time and with the same objective. The idea is that it is possible to
create a synergy that will enhance the impact of the regulation.
One example is the programme to reduce repetitive strain injuries,
which included enforcement by the authorities, ﬁnancial support
for workplace changes, and extensive information activities.
Moreover, it also included an agreement on reducing repetitive
work between the employers and the unions (Hasle et al., 2004).
Such agreements are in line with the general ‘‘Danish model’’
for industrial relations (Due and Madsen, 2008), in which the social
partners negotiate collective agreements on a wide range of issues
– in recent decades, increasingly also on the working environment
(Hasle and Petersen, 2004; Sørensen et al., 2009). Such agreements
are not dominated by the state, but they often reﬂect state policy in
some way, and in many cases are used to avoid government inter-
ference (Hasle et al., 2004; Hasle and Petersen, 2004). They are also
backed by the possibility of sanctions in the labour courts and from
the perspective of the individual organisation can therefore be seen
as similar to state regulation.
In other cases, the social partners and other non-government
organisations function in close connection or even in symbiosis
with the state. That happens, for instance, in the case of bi- and tri-
partite bodies such as the Danish Working Environment Council
and the sectorial working environment councils. On the one hand,
they have relatively strong inﬂuence on state policy and thereby on
the application of the three basic policy instruments, and on the
other hand they work with interpretation and implementation of
the state policy decided upon. In doing so, information about good
practice, including warnings about the possible negative conse-
quences of not controlling the risk, is the key tool. The information
from the social partners in the councils is negotiated and therefore
also constitutes a kind of semi-legal standard which may receive
attention from employers and employees, because it expresses a
joint opinion from both employer and employee organisations.
Certiﬁcation of occupational health and safety management
systems (OHSMSs) (BSI, 1999; Hasle and Zwetsloot, 2011; Robson
et al., 2007; Zwetsloot et al., 2011a,b) is another example, in which
non-government actors develop systems which gain semi-legal
status and are more or less intertwined with the state. The state
is involved in the development of standards at both national and
international level and uses these standards, for instance, in the
rationalisation of risk-based inspections. In Denmark, organisa-
tions with a certiﬁed OHSMS are relieved from regular inspections
(Hohnen and Hasle, 2011) and certiﬁcation is used as a substitute
for inspection, for instance, of asbestos renovation in the Nether-
lands (Zwetsloot et al., 2011a, b). But the state has only limited
control of the certifying mechanism, and the market plays an
important role, which may reduce the effectiveness of the risk con-
trol (Zwetsloot et al., 2011a,b).
Vedung’s (1998) three policy instruments, as mentioned above,
have a basically asymmetrical nature, and it could be argued that a
typology should also include more symmetrical instruments. But
even the use of the term policy instruments implies that someone
wants somebody to do something they are not already doing. Even
in the case of the social partner agreements and the functioning of
bi- and tripartite councils, there are still some societal actors who
want to inﬂuence the behaviour of employers and employees. So
3 We use the term organisation as a synonym for the terms company, ﬁrm and
enterprise in order to cover both private and public workplaces.
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although the state – powerful as it is – should be considered just
one actor in society, we will continue to use the typology of the
three policy instruments: regulation, incentives and information.
3.2. Institutional theory
The next question is: What makes organisations react to the
application of policy instruments? The better we understand the
motives for the reaction, the better we can develop our knowledge
about the mechanisms which will make the policy instruments
work in an efﬁcient manner. Institutional theory can provide
important insights into the organisational motives to react in cer-
tain ways to societal attempts to push the implementation of pre-
ventive occupational health and safety measures.
For the analysis in this paper we found organisational institu-
tionalism particularly inspiring (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991;
Greenwood et al., 2008). It is helpful in this context because it con-
ceptualises organisational behaviour in a way that on the one hand
suggests a fairly high level of patterned behaviour that allows for
recognition, explanation and perhaps even an element of predic-
tion, and on the other hand gives up the rationalism that tends
to underlie most mainstream explanatory efforts in studies of reg-
ulation and the conduct of organisations.
Scott (2001) has provided us with a simple but useful map of
where to look for institutional aspects of organisations. He sug-
gests that institutions are built on three pillars: the regulative,
the normative, and the cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar
deals with the explicit side of regulation: how we as a society set
rules, monitor that they are obeyed, and how non-compliance is
sanctioned. The normative pillar deals with what is right and
wrong, not in legal terms but in social and moral terms. As it is,
a lot of attention has been given to the normative aspect in recent
research on regulation, in particular Kagan and Gunningham
(2011). The authors raise the question as to why organisations gen-
erally comply with regulations when the chances of being caught
for breaching the rules are slim and the sanctions are usually al-
most inﬁnitesimal. Their answer is that they – or key actors within
the organisations – feel obliged to do so. The cultural-cognitive pil-
lar emphasises what is taken for granted: habits and practices
based on neither rules nor norms, but on generally held beliefs of
how things work around here. Roles are an important element in
the cultural-cognitive pillar, because roles are pre-deﬁned or pre-
known positions in the social networks that constitute organisa-
tions and their exchange relations with the surrounding society.
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) use the same understanding in
their introduction of the concept of isomorphism. They propose
that a major driver for organisations is the need for legitimacy
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; See also Suchman, 1995), and
that isomorphism, or copying from other organisations, is the main
way to achieve legitimacy. There are three forms of isomorphism:
coercive, normative and mimetic which would be important moti-
vators for occupational health and safety measures in an organisa-
tion. In the ﬁrst case, an organisation may experience outside
pressure as a way of forcing implementation of particular
measures; in the second case, the organisation follows the norms
observed among stakeholders; and in the third case, the organisa-
tion does what everybody else seems to be doing. These three
forms of isomorphism are useful for our further analysis of the rea-
sons for organisations to act on societal working environment
interventions.
3.3. Realist analysis
We now have on the one side a set of policy instruments which
are available for state and civil society actors and on the other side
a basic understanding of the motives for organisations to react to
policy instruments, and in addition knowledge is available from
intervention research on measures which could be beneﬁcial for
the working environment. The next step is to ﬁnd ways to analyse
the relationship between those two sides. Realist analysis can pro-
vide a stepping stone for the development of an analytical frame-
work (Pawson, 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997; Pedersen et al.,
2012). As indicated in the critical reﬂections on RCT intervention
research and Cochrane reviews, context-free causal relations do
not exist in social programmes in society and reactions to
programme interventions are therefore not arbitrary. The reactions
follow certain logics and rules which depend on the context
(Dyhrberg and Jensen, 2004) but also have similarities from case
to case. Pawson and Tilley (1997) suggest that this similarity can
be understood as the interaction between mechanisms and
context. Mechanisms can be deﬁned as:
‘‘... the engines of explanation in realist analysis. We can make
rough sense of the world through its demi-regularities. The rhythms
and associations of natural and even social systems are constant
enough that we can navigate our way through them, although, as
just argued, we are never particularly surprised when things don’t
work out as expected. We rely on mechanisms to tell us why inter-
connections should occur. A sequence of events or a pattern of
behaviour are explained as being part of a system and the mecha-
nism tells us what it is about that system that generates the unifor-
mity. Mechanisms explain causal relations by describing the
‘powers’ inherent in a system, be those systems substances like
gases and gunpowder) or agents (like examiners or policy-makers)
or structures (like bureaucracies or social programmes). In all cases
it is something about the ‘propensity’ of the system that explains
the causal regularities. The mechanism explains what it is about
the system that makes things happen.’’ (Pawson., 2006, p. 23)
Mechanisms play out in a certain context – a speciﬁc organisa-
tion in a speciﬁc sector in a speciﬁc country – which will inﬂuence
what the end result will be. In some cases, the context facilitates
that the mechanisms may lead to the expected outcome of a pro-
gramme; in others, the outcome will be quite different, and in
yet others, there may be no outcome. That is why mechanisms pro-
duce semi-regularities rather than regularities. The situation is eas-
ily recognisable from how policy instruments inﬂuence the
working environment ﬁeld. For any speciﬁc rule, there will be a
number of organisations that comply with the rule, others that will
do a variety of other things which they may consider relevant but
are far from the intentions of the policy makers, and yet others will
do almost nothing. For each of these reactions, the context of the
organisation is likely to explain a large share of the difference in
outcome. Some organisations may have a strategy of maintaining
a high level of compliance, and therefore employ dedicated health
and safety professionals who ensure the practical implementation
of the rule, whereas others may be struggling for the survival of the
business with no time for concern about working environment
rules, or they may just do the same as everybody else. Thus, con-
text includes both internal (structural and cultural) matters as well
as external conditions, such as the market, stakeholders, and sector
characteristics.
The focus for realist analysis is to learn how a social programme
works, for whom and under what circumstances (Pawson and Til-
ley, 1997). In this way, realist analysis offers a potential framework
for the analysis of the gap between working environment policies
and the outcome in terms of changed workplace practices. By
uncovering the mechanisms which make some organisations will-
ing to improve the working environment and others abstain, we
can set up programme theories (Rogers, 2008) for the function of
working environment policy instruments (Olsen et al., 2012) which
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can be used to optimise the effect of the policies and subsequently
allow for the evaluation of the outcome and further optimisation.
3.4. A model for the relationship between policy instruments and
working environment outcome
By combining the three theoretical approaches, we can now
suggest a simple model which can outline the relationship be-
tween the societal efforts to improve the working environment
on the one hand, and the outcome of the measures in organisations
on the other hand. Vedung’s typology provides the policy
instruments, realistic evaluation contributes programme theory,
mechanisms and context, and institutional theory gives us a ﬁrst
approximation of the generic mechanisms behind the organisa-
tional changes which are supposed to improve the working
environment.
The logic is that state and civil society actors develop a pro-
gramme which combines the policy instruments into a speciﬁc
blend which the actors believe will achieve the political goals.
We use the term programme, but it does not need to be a cohesive
or explicit programme jointly developed by all relevant actors. It
can also be developed over time as different actors add more activ-
ities to the programme, but for the organisations it will be experi-
enced as various elements aimed at the same goal – some speciﬁc
action to improve the working environment. The organisations’
reactions to the programme are formed by a combination of con-
text and mechanisms with elements of coercion, norms and imita-
tion. Mechanisms and context together have an impact on the
outcome in terms of improvements (or otherwise) in the working
environment (see Fig. 1).
4. Application of the model to bricklaying
To demonstrate the applicability of the model, we provide an
analysis of a concrete example from the construction industry. It
is the story of an extended process lasting approximately ten years,
and it illustrates how a programme emerges, utilising all three pol-
icy instruments, and how it can lead to positive changes in the
workplaces. The case analysis is based on data from the evaluation
of the programme (Mathiesen and Pedersen, 2010).
The case started in the late nineties when the bipartite Working
Environment Council for the Construction Sector (WEC-Construc-
tion)4 funded a research report which concluded that bricklayers
had a high risk of musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) (Nielsen and
Mølgaard, 2002). The risk was especially related to bricklaying from
scaffolding. The report proposed a reduction in the height of each
bricklaying sequence before elevating the scaffold from one and a
half metres to one metre. This would avoid the most damaging work
postures. At the same time, the inspectors from the Working Envi-
ronment Authority started to give improvement notices to construc-
tion companies, requiring them to reduce the MSD risk for
bricklayers. WEC-Construction took up the case and argued that time
was needed to develop the necessary technical solutions. The
authorities agreed and put their inspection activities on hold, await-
ing a solution created by the Council.
WEC-Construction subsequently embarked on a process to
solve the problem. It was far from a simple task to implement
preventive measures in a very tradition-oriented sector. The pro-
cess included two main steps. The ﬁrst was to develop new tools
and bricklaying methods, and the second to introduce the new
measures to the companies in the sector. An important prerequi-
site was that the brick suppliers had to change their pallets from
containing 115 bricks to 80, which involved changes in pallets
and in their production layout. A number of technical aids had to
be developed, including new brick trolleys and modiﬁed scaffolds.
Changes in the work organisation were also necessary, because the
collective agreement on piecework encouraged the traditional way
of bricklaying.
WEC-Construction initiated projects that could develop the
technical aids and encouraged the brickworks to develop and pro-
vide the 80-brick pallets. Pilot tests in bricklaying companies were
funded by the Danish Prevention Fund, which gives ﬁnancial sup-
port to working environment projects. An important element was
to create comprehensive guidelines for both employers and brick-
layers. These explained in detail how the one-metre bricklaying
should be carried out and the measures that were necessary to
introduce the method. The guidelines were developed in coopera-
tion between the employers’ association and the unions. Reaching
an agreement took time, but eventually they succeeded, and
employers and unions started to inform and instruct their respec-
tive members through dissemination of the written guidelines,
developing internet-based instructions, information meetings and
dissemination through other media.
The employers’ association were motivated by the pressure
from the Working Environment Authority to enforce improve-
ments in their member companies. Regulation and the threat of
enforcement was therefore an important driver. The Labour
Inspectorate for its part took the newly developed guidelines as
the point of departure for restarting the inspections and issuing
speciﬁc legal improvement notices to the companies on the con-
struction sites.
The unions, of course, were motivated by the possibility of
improving conditions for their members. Nevertheless, they were
forced to put a lot of effort into the information campaign, be-
cause not all bricklayers found the way of working beneﬁcial.
Furthermore, there was a rather unfortunate consequence in
the way the new method increased the heavy lifting of the
bricklayer’s unskilled labourers as they carried bricks to the scaf-
fold. Attention to their working conditions therefore also became
urgent during the process, and a number of additional measures
were developed.
The evaluation of the programme (Mathiesen and Pedersen,
2010) indicates a number of important results:
 Almost all employers and bricklayers in the sector had knowl-
edge about the new methods and they were acquainted with
the guidelines.
 There was a widespread acceptance of the new methods.
 A substantial proportion of the companies visited actually
worked in accordance with the method, either fully or at least
to some extent.
Fig. 1. A model for the relationship between policy instruments and working environment outcome.
4 The legislation in Denmark has stipulated the establishment of 11 bi-partite
sector speciﬁc working environment councils. They get a certain basic funding from
the state, and their main objective is to develop and disseminate information,
including guidance on best practice.
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4.1. Policy instruments and mechanisms in the bricklaying case
The case can be used to highlight several points relevant for our
search for the links between policy instruments and changes in the
working environment. First of all, the process of creating a new
standard for bricklaying seems to have been important for the
outcome in the workplaces. WEC-Construction was originally
established as an institution linked to the ‘information’ policy
instrument, but when we look at the whole process, it is clear that
the Council successfully integrated elements of the two other
instruments: regulation and incentives. They used the initial pres-
sure from inspections as a stepping stone for the joint employer-
union project, and they utilised the economic incentives provided
by the state to secure funding for the crucial development and
practical testing of the new technical solutions. The bricklaying
case therefore shows how the three policy instruments can be
combined:
 Regulation: Initial pressure on the sector from labour inspectors
issuing concrete improvement notices, acceptance of a halt to
inspections as technical solutions were developed, and subse-
quently the use of the WEC-Construction guidelines as the
new standard for inspection practices.
 Incentives: Economic support from the Prevention Fund to
develop technical solutions and for practical testing.
 Information: Guidelines with detailed instructions from WEC-
Construction were disseminated through a number of platforms
and, most importantly, actively promoted by both employers’
associations and unions.
This speciﬁc blend constitutes what with hindsight we can call
the programme to prevent MSD among bricklayers, and it illus-
trates how the policy instruments have a very concrete and speciﬁc
conﬁguration in which each element enhances the others and cre-
ates synergy which increases the chance of a successful outcome.
Another important point is related to the way the programme
came about. The key actors were the employers, the unions and
WEC-Construction, with the authorities playing an important role
in creating the initial pressure, but subsequently maintaining a
rather low proﬁle. These roles illustrate the move from state con-
trol to the network governance model, in which several actors – ci-
vil society as well as state actors – all have important roles, and in
this case the civil society actors even played the leading roles,
although the initial enforcement was a prerequisite for the agree-
ment between employers and unions.
A change in employer-union relations on the issue of the work-
ing environment paved the road for these new roles. From the 70s
until the late 90s, the working environment was a conﬂict issue
with little cooperation, and both parties tended to put pressure
on the state to get their political viewpoints implemented. This sit-
uation has slowly changed over the last 15 years. The two parties
have gradually moved towards closer cooperation in the realisation
that they thus gain two advantages: (1) Agreement between the
two parties allows them to have a stronger inﬂuence on state reg-
ulation, and (2) their members (employers and employees) no
longer receive confusing and contradictory signals about what to
do and not to do. Each side has its reasons for this shift of position.
The employers realised that they would have a stronger hand in
the resulting concrete regulation if they played a positive role
rather than just opposing new regulation, and at the same time
they could see greater interest in the working environment among
their members – at least in the bigger organisations. The unions
could see the difﬁculties in the practical implementation of work-
ing environment policies when they were ﬁrmly opposed by the
employers, and they also experienced a more cooperative attitude
among their members in the workplace (Hasle and Petersen, 2004;
for further discussion of this development see Sørensen et al.,
2009).
If we turn to the perspective of the bricklaying companies, we
can identify elements of the three main drivers (mechanisms) for
organisational adaptation:
 Coercive: The employers would have experienced the initial
improvement notices from inspectors as coercion, and at a time
with limited compliance possibilities because the technical
solutions were not available. By the end of the process, coercion
was prevalent again as the inspectors applied the new solutions
as the standard for bricklaying.
 Normative: The unanimous message from the employers’ asso-
ciations and unions about both the necessity and the advanta-
ges of using the new technical solutions played an important
role in the development of new norms in the sector. The recom-
mendation from their own employer association conﬁrmed that
application of the technical solutions was the ethically correct
thing to do.
 Mimetic: As employers and bricklayers started to see examples
of others applying the methods, they found it more convincing
to apply the methods themselves.
In real life, the three drivers cannot be separated. For each of the
employers, elements from all three drivers probably played a role.
Pressure from the authorities, the evolving norms in the sector, and
the observation of others were all important.
5. Perspectives
Our aim with this paper was to ﬁnd ways to bridge the gap be-
tween policy instruments and practice in the workplaces. Our sug-
gestion is a model which combines Vedung’s typology of policy
instruments, realistic evaluation’s mechanisms and context, and
institutional theory’s isomorphism as a means to achieve organisa-
tional legitimacy. The application of this model to the bricklayer
case shows that this understanding of the bridge between policy
and practice provides useful knowledge. Generalising the results
of the case, we can further suggest a number of important causal
relations (or demi-regularities, as Pawson and Tilley (1997) call
them). The most important ones are:
 An intervention programme is iterative. The actors rarely have a
fully-ﬂedged plan with a developed programme theory.
 The policy instruments are more efﬁcient when they are applied
in combination and closely aligned to the context of the target
group.
 The state as represented by the working environment authori-
ties does not have the power to enforce successful implementa-
tion of preventive measure on its own. However, enforcement,
or the threat of possible enforcement activities, is an important
motivating factor for the social partners to enter into agree-
ments and for employers to utilise information material and
training opportunities provided by the social partners and other
civil society actors.
 Collaboration and joint messages from the social partners are
important for the acceptance of new preventive measures in
the target group.
It may not, of course, always work as suggested above, but that
is just what Pawson and Tilley (1997) point out. There are no nat-
ural laws in social science, but on the other hand organisational
changes are not stochastic events either. There are half-regularities
where there is a reasonably good chance that the reactions can be
predicted to some extent. However, more analysis of half-regular-
ities is necessary to be more certain about what works and what
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does not work. Pawson (2006) suggests carrying out realistic re-
views where several studies of the same issues are included in
the analysis in order to get a more valid understanding of the
mechanism. We have demonstrated the potential of this approach
in our analysis of just one case, and similar analyses of cases in
other sectors or in relation to other risks will probably provide
new insights into the possibilities.
It is of particular importance to note that we have chosen a rel-
atively positive case in which employers and unions were able to
co-operate and were successful in inﬂuencing workplaces. It might
be relevant to study cases where employers and unions have
strong conﬂicting interests and the state has to play a bigger role
in enforcement (or perhaps abstain from doing anything). But even
in such cases it will be valuable to search for the mechanisms and
contexts that hinder a successful outcome.
Another important issue might be Vedung’s typology. It is based
on rather strongly asymmetrical relationships – the state wants
citizens to act in certain predeﬁned ways. Network society rela-
tions are perhaps more symmetrical and there could therefore be
other instruments in place. Agreements or covenants within a sec-
tor or networks might be one such a possibility.
For practice the conceptual model opens for an understanding
of the processes health and safety professionals are participating
in – whether they are advising or inspecting workplaces or they
are involved in the development of new working environment
programmes.
For research themodel canhelp tounderstandhownewevidence
about interventions canbe transformed into programmeswhich can
lead to a broader impact of the intervention knowledge. It is at the
same time a conceptual model, and it is therefore also calling for
more both theoretical and empirical studies that utilise the model
and therefore both test its applicability and provide new important
knowledge about the mechanisms that can lead to efﬁcient inter-
ventions which improve health and safety at the workplaces.
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